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INTRODUCTION
Zimbabwe? inherited an economy characterised by uneven 
development, possessing on the one hand a modern industrial and 
commercial sector which was primarily designed to serve the 
interests of the minority white settler- community, yet one which 
was notably dependent on foreign monopoly capital and technology, 
and, an the other hand, a low productivity and generally 
underdeveloped peasant sector. These colonial features of the 
economy were summarised most vividly in the first government 
economic policy statement, Growth with Equity. (1981) in the 
following terms;
"economic exploitation of the majority by the tew, the grossly 
uneven infrastructural and productive development of the rural 
and urban economy, the lopsided control of the major means of 
production and distribution, the unbalanced levels of 
development within and among sectors and the consequent 
grossly inequitable pattern of income distribution and of 
benefits to the overwhelming majority of the people of this 
country, stand as a serious indictment of our society. So does 
the imbalance between predominant foreign ownership and 
control of assets on the one hand and, on the other, limited 
local participation as also and more especially the past 
colonial dispossession of land and other economic assets and 
the consequential impoverishment of the masses of the people
..." < p. 1)
Emphasising the point of linkage between the two sectors, the 
Three-Year Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) 
1982/83-1984/85 said, “the two sectors, however, are not 
functionally separate and of particular importance in this regard 
is that the one, the modern sector, has historically fed on the
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other". The above two statements together capture, on the one 
hand, the essence of the problems and contradictions of 
capitalist development under colonialism and, on the other, the 
urgency of tackling those problems. The policy document went on 
to state the government’s determination to undertake "a vigorous 
programme for the development of the country" with the ultimate 
objective of establishing “a democratic, egalitarian and 
socialist society0.
But the achievement of the goal of growth with equity, let alone 
that of a truly socialist society, is not an unproblematic 
process as the experience of other third world countries which 
have embarked on this path has shown. For this will involve a 
number of interrelated and sometimes contradictory processes 
involving, on the one hand, the need to transform the colonial 
economic structures while, on the other hand, and because of the 
necessity to avoid economic collapse or chaos, preserving 
productive forces. The preservation of the productive forces has 
crucial significance in Zimbabwe not only because their
i
development had reached an advanced stage under coIon ial/rule but 
also because of the instructive experiences of Zimbabwe’s closest 
neighbour and ally, Mozambique.
The need to preserve productive forces was stressed in the
introductory chapter of the TNDR which said,
While the inherited economy, with its institutions and 
infrastructure, has in the past served a minority, it would be 
simplistic and, indeed, nai\/e to suggest that it should, 
therefore, be destroyed in order to make a fresh start. The 
challenge lies in building upon and developing on what was 
inherited, ...” p. 3.
These concerns are real and every socialist experience must 
confront them in one way or another(1).
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But a word of warning is perhaps appropriate here. What we are 
saying- is that even if a party and the state are committed to 
constructing social ism, the issue of preserving and developing 
productive forces, and of simultaneously transforming existing 
production relations, is one riddled with tensions. Moreover, as 
Lenin, knew well, and as the Chinese also stressed through their 
experience, these tensions also reflect class struggle(2). This 
is very much the case in Zimbabwe as we -shal1 show later..Thus 
while transformation is a protracted process, there are definite 
forces within society who have no interest to do so, and these 
will often hide as well behind the emphasis on preserving 
productive forces.
We must elaborate a little further on this point. Productive 
farces do not exist in a vacuum*, btLt bear the stamp of the social 
relations of production. What is inherited from the past is not 
just, technologies and people with varying skill levels, but 
capitalist labour processes set within capitalist relations of 
production which themselves are situated in varying concrete 
contexts - colonial settler-based capitalism in Zimbabwe with 
however strong dominance of foreign capital.
The task is to transform the colonial capitalist labour process. 
It . is important, in this respect, to understand the labour 
ppwer/labour dichotomy, the crucial concept in Marxist economic 
theory that delineates the essential non-exchange relations of 
the capitalist economy. Labour power, the commodity which is 
exchanged .in the labour market, is the human capacity to work. 
Labour, on the other hand, "is the active, concrete, living 
process carried bn by the workers! its expression is determined 
not only by labour power but also by the ability of the
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capitalist to exploit if CGintis, 1976, p. 37. . The aim of the 
capitalist is to extract as much surplus value as possible from 
the labourer. Three factors determine the extraction of surplus 
value: first is the length of the Honking day, i.e. the number 
of hours that the labourer has to work each days second is the 
intensity of labour related to' ho. hard the labourer works or is 
driven or motivated by the capitalist employer! th.rd is the 
productiveness of labour which results in more goods being 
produced in the same amount of time and with the same intensity 
of labour. The bringing together of large numbers of workers 
under one roof requires control and co-ordination. Under 
capitalist relations of production such control tends to be 
authoritarian and coercive (3).
Although some recognition is given to it, transforming the labour 
process is generally seen as being outside the domain of 
plann i ng.
V -HHrocs the issue of the transformation in summary, planning must address the issue
of the labour processes if at all it is concerned with advancing 
socialism. The issue is not merely one of seizing the commanding 
heights of the economy through nationalisations, but also of 
reorganising production and labour processes. Admittedly, this 
cannot be done overnight, but a clear strategy is needed so as to 
be able to identity tactical interventions. In this respect, the 
concrete conditions need to inform strategy. In the case of 
-Zimbabwe we need a clear understanding of colonial history in 
general and of the U11I period in particular, for, during 
regime the state was not just a laissez taire state but a 
strongly interventionist one. .he state itself invested 
significantly in public enterprise within key sectors of the
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economy and aided private as well as public capital to 
subordinate black labour under their command.
Hence, the inherited economic structure was comprised of a 
mixture of public and private enterprises (the latter mainly 
under contra! of foreign capital) and both.relying heavily on the 
state to structure their protitabi1ity through keeping black 
labour cheap and compliant. This is reflected in the organisation 
of the labour process and of the employment relationship. Hence, 
issues which will be of major concern in the transition period 
included
- the question of confidences not merely the fear of 
nationalisation, but also the question of labour and its. control;
- the incorporation of Zimbabweans into management and. ownership 
within a basically unchanged structure at control]
- th© state and the working class: will the state propel workers’ 
power within public enterprises and the private* sector or will it 
ally itself with capital against labourV
These are fundamental issues of planning which have become 
fudged. My paper attempts to highlight their importance and to 
put them back on the agenda.
5
THE COLONIAL INHERITANCE
An important -feature of the colonial economy is that far from 
being laissez faire, it was actually subject to close state 
regulation or ’planning’, especially with respect to the creation 
of and continued reproduction of labour power. For example, 
pre-World War II colonial development which centred around the 
white agrarian bourgeoisie who were aided to capture large 
portions o+ the most fertile and well-watered land iron the 
African peasantry was. not just a question of creating more land 
for settler agriculture, but a way to restrict the scope of 
peasant agriculture and of drawing labour from the peasanty.
Herein lies the origins of the ’success’ story of white 
commercial agriculture. Arrighi (1967) wrote about the two main 
consequences of land apportionment: first, it ensured an
expanding supply of labour to white farms, mines and industry as 
the productivity of peasant agriculture progressively became 
undermined and peasants were thrown on to the job market<4> and, 
second, it divided the economy into non-competing racial groups 
by restricting competition an produce and labour markets as well 
as other individual spheres(b).
Many studies that describe the impressive growth and 
technological development of the manufacturing sector up to the 
collapse of UDI tend to ignore the repressive labour regime that 
accompanied it. The colonial form of production organisation was 
based an very tight control over black unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour by white managements. White workers, on the other hand, 
formed a labour ’aristocracy’, which possessed the skills and 
jealously guarded their ’skilled’ jobs. The state not only
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propelled the industrialisation process but also shaped the
conditions -for cheap black labour while acting as a bulwark for 
the white skilled workers(6). But the expansion of capitalist 
industry involved the need for the flexible use of labour and 
came into conflict with the racial character of the division of 
labour. .
At first capitalist employers relied on unskilled ]abour . 
recruited on a migrant basis. With the rapid growth of industry 
and the shortage of skilled labour, many employers began to make 
efforts to stabilise the African labour force for use in 
industry. Many ’welfare* schemes designed to stabilise labour, 
such as hostel or compound accommodation, rations, etc., were 
installed. but broadening the base for black labour while 
keeping it cheap propelled changes in the organisation of the 
labour process, in the employment relation and the structure of 
the labour market.
Major battles were fought between white skilled workers and 
capitalist employers who pushed ahead with job fragmentation to 
bring in semi-ski 1 led African workers<7). The main objective of 
the capitalist employers was not just to ’deskill’ the white 
workers but to use the less expensive semi-skilled labour more 
flexibly and thus increase profits. .
The potential of semi-skilled African workers since the beginning 
of the Second World War was recognised by the Todd Select 
Committee when it said, “Since the beginning of the Second World 
War.... there has been the beginning of what can fairly be 
described as an industrial revolution. In the older industries 
Africans have learned to do jobs of a higher grade than _
labourers' work and, in a number of cases, to do fully skilled
V
work. At the same time new industries have been established on 
- mass production lines where, except tor a small number of 
European supervisors and European engineers to maintain and 
repair the machinery, practically the whole labour force consists 
o-f Africans! and it has come to be 'realised that the aptitude of 
Africans for this type of operative work, and the availability of 
large numbers of them, is one of the most important factors
favourable to the development of modern secondary industry in 
this country." (p. S)
While under the 1959 Industrial Conciliation Act (Chapter 267) 
the definition of ’employee’ included all races, the .Act was not 
designed to facilitate the growth of African trade unions. Its 
basic feature was control of- unregistered trade unions, all of 
which were African. While unregistered trade unions were given 
no status under the law they were nevertheless closely watched -
they were required to noti-fy the Registrar of their existence, 
supply copies of their constitution, keep books of account, etc.
In presenting the Bill to Parliament the Minister responsib1e <8) 
admitted and confirmed that "to provide for these associations is 
nothing more than a control measure" (Col. 1547). Moreover, the 
road to registration was meant to be as hard as possible.
According to the Minister, the Bill was not meant to "open the 
door wide to full trade union rights for ail overnight." (Col. 
1547)
I he change in the labour law was not a benevolent act. It was a 
result of, on the one hand, the struggles and growing militacy of 
the black labour movement and, on the other hand, a response to 
changes at the level of production which brought blacks into 
semi-ski 1 led work. fhe 1959 legislation did not however apply to
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agricultural and domestic workers whose conditions of service 
continued to be governed by the Masters and Servants Act.
Another important -feature o-f the Act was the protection afforded 
to ’minority, interests’ or skilled members of a trade union.
While no person could be excluded from a trade union on the 
grounds of race, colour or religion, the constitution of a trade 
union.could provide "for its membership•to be divided into 
branches on the basis of class of work or enterprise or the place 
of work or business or tfce sex or the race or colour of the 
members, or otherwise.1 (Section 50(3) (b) p. 64).
During UD1, the Rhodesia Front government took more, steps to 
protect and enhance the interests of the white artisan class.
They tightened surveilienee over National Industrial Council 
Agreements and the organisation of apprenticeship training. A 
classic example of the government’s protection of white 
journeymen was revealed in a confrontation between- the Ministry 
of Labour and the Transport Operators’ Association in 19'/6 
following the recommendations of the sub-committee of the 
National Industrial Board of the Transport Operating Industry set 
up to, inter alia, "investigate the work performed by unskilled 
and semi-skilled employees in the workshops of establishments in 
the industry". The sub-comm i t tee* s report, which recommended a major 
fragmentation of skilled jobs, was rejected by the Ministry on 
the grounds that there were many operations.which either 
infringed on journeymen’s work or could not be satisfactorily 
identified with the 'Agreements’ jobs (a reference tc the Motor 
Industry Agreement which .the Ministry claimed was the ’parent 
body*). The Transport Operators’ Association objected strongly 
to the Ministry’s position and to the fact that certain sections
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of.their recommendations had been referred to the Industrial 
Council of the Motor Trade. Why should recommendations of a 
sub-committee of the Industrial Board for one industry be 
referred to another, they charged? They rejected the suggestion 
that the Motor Trade was the 'parent body'(9).
The Rhodesian Front government also passed many amendments to the 
Industrial Conciliation Act designed either to protect white 
journeymen or to keep a tight lid over black ;trade unions(lO).
It is clear from the foregoing that colonial capitalism was not 
based on laissez faire, but was characterised by a strong 
interventionist state. Private capital had came to rely on the 
state to support it, particularly with respect to labour. It 
will want to perpetuate the pre-independence form of production 
organisation.
PLANNING AND LABOUR IN POST-INDEPENDENCE ZIMBABWE.
In this section we focus on the implications of planning for 
transtarming labour. in this respect, the land question and the 
emancipation of the peasantry have been in the forefront of 
post-independence policy debates. As we have seen, peasant 
agriculture progressively became marginalised under colonial rule 
through the expropriation. o+ ^ fertile and rain-fed land and 
discriminatory pricing and marketing policies; The communal lands 
were thus reduced to ’labour reserves’, with able-bodied men 
leaving to seek wage employment. These effects were felt more 
strongly in the areas with lower agroecological potential(11>. 
Remittances of migrant labour became and continued .to be a major 
source of peasant incomes and, in some cases, a condition of 
agricultural development(12).
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The coming of independence opened up pass ibi 1 i t ies -for 
restructuring the relationship between the state and the 
peasantry. Real transformation would require amongst other 
measures, a significant redistribution of good land to.the 
peasantry ( 13) . This will create more employment and incomes -for . 
the rural population. It must be recalled that driving African 
peasants onto dry and' infertile land was the major cause of 
labour migrancy. Provision of more land must be accompanied by 
changes in the forms of production organisation and in the social 
relations of production in farming. The resettlement programme 
has progressed slowly with some 36 000 households resettled by 
1986(id). Among the obstacles to a more thorough going, land 
redistribution programme is the Lancaster* House- Constitution 
whose “Bill of Rights® provisions restrict the government's 
ability to acquire land except on a “willing seller willing 
buyer" basis of land that is ’underutilised’-. The result is that 
only abandoned farms in the drier and poorer areas nave been 
available to the government(15).
Moreover, most of the resettlement schemes have been of the Model 
A type of individual plots rather than the Model a involving 
co-operatives. The latter held the promise of a real 
transformation of social relations of production in farming - but 
has so far faced immense problems due to lack of capital, 
technical support and management(L6).
The attempts by government to enforce changes in the status of 
farm workers, have met with resistance from the large scale 
commercial farmers who have responded by rapidly displacing 
labour for capital(17).
Thus attempts at radical land reform have encountered severe
li
limitation* not only from the Lancaster House Constitution but 
,lsa from the perceived need to preserve the existing productive 
forces while simultaneously opening up further opportunities for 
individual accumulation which entrench interests against 
fundamental change.
haced by all these problems actual government policy has shifted 
towards channelling more resources to the communal areas, with 
lesser emphasis on resettlement<10>, Kecent research shows that, 
this wHl fuel further differentiation in the country*ide(1*>- It 
has been shown, moreover, that the post-independence increase in 
marketed output by the peasantry has not meant lesser 
vulnerability of its poorer strata who continue to suffer from
1 1-hLS Will accelerate the movement ofhunger and mal nutr 1 1 ion (20) . ihLS win
the rural poor and unemployed in search of wage employment at a 
time when -formal employment is contracting.
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PLANNING AND THE COMMODITY LABOUR POWER
The preceeding discussion has indicated that in the colonial 
period labour power was a commodity but not set within the 
.-framework of a free market. The context was, rather, of heavy 
state intervention and political subjugation of the black working 
class and the peasantry.
Post colonial development cannot therefore merely consist of 
liberalising or freeing the labour market from its racially 
segregated fragmentation, but must involve conscious steps to 
allocate labour with the aim of reducing unemployment and 
providing stable livelihoods to the producing classes. Ihis is a 
critical issue of planning. But what really has happened'
At independence, capitalists had two main concerns: firstly,
they were tearful about the prospect of expropriation or 
nationalisation of their assets and, secondly, they were worried 
about the loss of control oyer labour as this was bound to 
undercut their chances tor further accumulation. These 
conditions were guaranteed under the colonial state which was not 
sensitive to the needs of the black workers and the peasantry.
The tear was that the black government would give too much power 
to the black workers and that this could disrupt the balance of 
power in industry with serious consequences tor capitalist 
accumulation. 1980 and 1981 indeed saw Hild-cat strikes and 
challenges of managerial power by industrial workers. Among the 
main demands of the strikers were: Jn igher wages, dismissal of
hated white managers/supervisors, reinstatement of dismissed 
workers, etc. However, the government used its weight and moral 
authority to stem the labour unrest and inserted itself between
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the- capitalist employer and the workers as the guardian o+ labour 
discipline. More emphasis came to be placed on increased 
productivity and the development o+ "good communications'' between 
workers and employers. The call -for discipline and stability was 
to underscore the need to preserve productive Torres. But it was 
clear also that the struggle was over the content of 
i ndependence.
Sachikonye (1986) has provided a use+ul account o+ the strike 
wave of 1980-81(21). He, however, seems to subscribe to the view 
that the strikes were "disorganised" and that they were a result 
of "a poor state of communication between management and workers 
in most firms". "The strikes", he said, "had thrown into broad 
relief the yawning gap in communication flows while management 
Mas particularly worried by the militancy displayed by workers in 
conflicts on the shopfloor" (p. 257)(22). Sachikonye also, in my
view, puts undue emphasis on the "weakness" or “ineffectiveness" 
of trade unions which he says "could not be counted upon to 
articulate workers* demands or restrain their members from 
spontaneous industrial action" (p. 255). It is widely known that
crippling and weakening ®the trade union movement was a priority 
agenda of the colonial state. That did not, however, kill the 
rank and file movement.
The significance of the 1980-81 strikes is that the workers
themselves rose spontaneousiy countrywide to demonstrate their
hatred of the exploitative and repressive system of colonial
9capitalism which was characterised by low wages and surplus 
control of labour. The strikers demanded not only higher wages 
but also changes in the authoritarian system of management. What 
needs to be highlighted, in my view, is the way the state
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responded by moving quickly to contain the strike movement and
thus aligning itself firmly with capital but all in the name of 
the “national interest". 7he retreat of the state was further- 
demonstrated in the case of the agro-industry strikes in 1985 
involving plantation and factory workers in private (mainly TNCs 
but also large scale commercial farmers) and parastatal 
enterprises based mainly in Manicaland (for coffee and tea) and 
Chiredzi (for sugar). In July 1965, the government had announced 
a new minimum wage of $143,/-'b for agro-i ndus tr i al workers. But . 
the entire industry - apparently with the support of the 
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement - applied 
far exemption from the new minimum wage arguing that they were 
unable to pay du.e to very low world prices and input costs. At 
first the Ministry of- Labour refused to consider blanket 
exemptions pointing out that the law allowed employers facing 
economic hardships to apply for exemption an an individual basis 
As the employers dug in and threatened retrenchment of thousands 
of workers, the state was forced to give in. The strategy of the 
employers was to farce a distinction between plantation workers 
and those who worked in the factories. In the final settlement 
plantation workers were awarded a new minimum wage of $05 per 
month while factory workers received $110 per month(23).
Two significant pro-labour measures taken by government through 
emergency powers were the introduction of the legal minimum wage 
from July 1900(24) and regulations barring employers from 
dismissing workers except with the approval of the Minister of 
Labour. This represented a significant departure from colonial 
labour policy, the regulations are a continuing bone of 
contention between the employers and the government. Government
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sees the measure as a means of maintaining employment whereas the 
employers see it as an infringement on their right to hire and 
fire. The difficult years of draught and recession and the 
problems of foreign.exchange shortages opened the way tor 
employers to rationalise labour processes. First, many employers 
resorted to short-time-warking on the basis of three or four days 
in a working week, but, secondly, many found ways to retrench 
workers although government’s regulations served as a mitigating 
factor(251.
Recently, there has been renewed pressure on the government to 
revise the 'no tiring and no hiring' regulations which, employers 
claim, oblige them to keep ula.zyu and “unproductive" workers.
££mp layers are particularly unhappy about what they call the "red 
tape bureaucracy and time-wasting delays that clog up the 
justification process"(26)..The Chief Justice of Zimbabwe, who 
also sits on the Labour Relations Tribunal, recently put himself 
firmly of? the side of the employers when he said of the Labour 
Relations Act, "The Act forces employers to keep unproductive 
workers and to shut their doors t.o would-be future employees who 
may prove to be better workers. There must be competition on the 
labour market. The general impression is that the Labour 
Relations Act says: ’thou shalt not dismiss a-lazy worker. If you
do, the heavy hammer of the Ministry of Labour will descend on 
your skull'". The Chief Justice added, "this policy cannot be 
right in a country in which unemployment is high. 1 have good 
reason to believe that the attitude of lazy workers would change 
tomorrow were employers to have a tree hand in the control and 
management of labour. They would dismiss unproductive workers and 
employ hard-working onesM2V).
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Xt is clear from the above what the real pre-occupation of the
employers is about: it is to.discip1ine the workforce - by using
the stick of unemployment. The response of the government to 
pressure by the employers- Mil 1 be important in defining or 
redefining future state-labour and state-capital relations, that 
is, tor the future of industrial relations in Zimbabwe.
One of the early measures taken by the majority government in 
1980 was the establishment of Workers* Committees in all 
industrial establishments. Workers Committees were reconfirmed 
under the Labour Relations Act 198b which repealed the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1959. Does the Labour Relations Act actually 
give more power to the workers and their organisations? Will it 
facilitate the transformation of the capitalist labour process? 
Nzombe has commented that while it recognises the right of 
workers to organise Workers’ Committees and trade unions, it 
contains very severe restrictions designed essentially to control 
the workers* organisations and to prevent them from using the 
strike weapon to achieve higher wages and better cnnditions(Z8)- 
The right to strike is so severely limited under the law that it 
becomes virtually impossible to conceive of a legal strike. An 
extensive role is given to state officials to ensure industrial 
peace.
While the economic stabilisation programme initiated in 198Z did 
help to achieve external balance, it had the effectof placing a 
heavier burden on wage earners through reduced formal sector 
employment and substantial increases in the prices of basic 
f oodstuf f s (129) . (Government freezes on wages from 198 Z also had 
the effect of reducing real wages. More recently, government has 
committed itself to take further adjustment measures aimed, inter
1/
alia, at reducing the budget deficit. Government has also
agreed, in principle, to institute a process of trade 
liberalisation. It remains to be seer, what the effect of these 
will be on employment and labour.
RESTRUCTURING THE LABOUR PROCESS
Government policies and plans must be seen against the backdrop 
of a deteriorating domestic and international economic climate. 
While between 1980 and 1981, following independence and 
liberalised foreign exchange allocations, the economy grew very 
rapidly achieving GDP growth rates of 11 percent and 13 percent 
respectively in real terms, the economic c.limate changed markedly 
in the period 1982-84 due to a combination of the worst drought 
and international recession which plunged the country into severe 
balance of payments problems. The end of 1984 saw the beginnings 
of recovery with a good agricultural season while 198S was a very 
good year with a GDP growth rate of about 10 percent. But this 
was short-lived as the economy dived into recession again in 
1VB6 with little prospect of real growth in 1987.
Since 1982, government economic policy came to focus more on 
achieving external balance - with negative consequences on 
growth, employment and income distribution(30).
Planning in the context of a declining economic climate will 
clearly have to be much more than merely directing investment and 
stating priorities in the use of resources (important though 
these dimensions of planning are) but also has to address the 
organisation of production and the transformation of labour 
i tse1f.
My research on this theme is in progress. My main focus is on
it)
labour processes in the manu+acturing sector. So +ar? 1 have
done research in two engineering companies as well as a 
comprehensive study o+ the Clothing Industry National Employment 
Council. Work on the Motor Industry National Employment Council 
is continuing. All this material still has to be processed and 
analysed -fully. What follows are therefore my preliminary 
thoughts which are necessarily tentative and incomplete.
The restructuring of labour processes necessarily involves 
political struggles, and needs organising on the basis of worker 
education and increased participation in decision-making by the 
workers in ways which limit certain avenues of capitalist 
accumulation. This is an issue of politics as well as economics, 
and it involves struggles since verbal comnri tment to socialism is 
not always backed by real commitment.
In their book on African industrialisation, barker, et al 11986), 
show how an increasing division between mental and manual work 
had developed In Tanzanian enterprises as a consequence of rhe 
growth in the size and influence of management and engineer 
personnel in relation to production workers. This typical 
colonial division of labour tends to exclude most of the workers 
from planning, designing and control tasks which become 
exclusively the jobs of managers and engineers. The skilled 
tasks performed by production workers included quality control 
and repair and maintenance work(311.
The point was made earlier that the colonial form of production 
organisation was based on a very tight control of black labour by 
white managements. Under this division of labour, management and 
supervisory staff do not do manual work. They merely exercise 
control over production processes and over workers. 1 he top
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managers and engineers are still overwhelmingly white seven years 
after independence. The capitalist owners seem to want to keep 
things that way. The Deputy Prime Minister, Simon Muzenda, made 
a scathing attack on the mining industry in 19&V* He said the 
government was concerned that in the middle to senior management 
in both technical and administrative areas there seemed to be "a 
preserve tor whites while black Zimbabweans remained con+ined to 
senior.posit ions in personnel or industrial relations. “A number 
of black Zimbabwean engineers with relevant qualifications11, he 
said, “have had to leave some private companies out of 
frustration. It is inconceivable that seven years after 
independence, the corporate policies of our mining companies 
still reflect the old attitudes of basing advancement in a job on 
racial lines". “While it is not the government’s intention to 
promote incompetent people to higher positions, it is still not 
right that advancement be based an race, and so it is hoped that 
this phenomenon will be redressed in the very near future"(32).
An important question that arises is: what has been the result
of government intervention to promote a black managerial class 
and the acquisition of shares by the state in private 
enterprises? One result has simply been incorporation into 
existing, essentially capitalist, structures and institutions. 
Such an outcome amounts to co-optation not transf ormat ion. t‘he 
main issue shifts towards control over surplus value, that is, a 
division of surplus value between national and foreign control.
It becomes very much planning without, transformation and hence 
the demand for capitalist efficiency grows stronger. the 
substitution of black tor white managers and the process of 
co-optation are reflective of the tension between preserving
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productive -forces within a process o-f transition and building up
forces which counter such transition itself. Training of. both 
managers and workers is clearly very important. The training o-f 
a management cadre has tended to reproduce technocrats with 
little or no political commitment. Besides rudimentary 
on-the-job training by -firms to meet their immediate needs, the 
training o-f shop-floor workers has been neglected. The result is 
that a hierarchical division of labour still persists and can 
only lead to the alienation of shopfloor workers. The older 
workers with a lot of experience but still on the- minimum wage 
have no hope because they realise that they have little formal 
education. While some are keen to improve themselves through 
further education, the environment at work is not conducive to 
study. By the end of the day they are so tired they cannot do 
any th i ng.
Interviews with workers in the engineering firms so far covered 
in our study show no increase in confidence that things have 
changed in the direction of giving more power to the workers to 
influence decision-making at the enterprise.
While Workers’ Committees have been established and continue to 
confront management with workers' demands, their powers are very 
limited. And it is almost impossible to use the strike as a 
weapon of struggle. All decisions about investment, production 
levels, employment, and so on, are preserves of the board of 
directors and top management.
Works Councils - a joint Committee of workers representatives and 
management - have also been established. Xn theory, Works 
Councils are meant to promote workers’ participation in 
decision-making in the enterprise, but in reality they are used
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Theyas a means of communicating management decisions downward, 
also d i scuss i ssues of discipline,- the need to i ncrease 
productivity, and welfare matters.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The preceeding discussion suggests that however you look at 
planning you cannot do that successfully without looking at the 
dynamics of production and work processes. *1 he argument of 
'preserving the productive farces', a strong issue in 
post-independence Zimbabwe, is an argument tor preserving those 
labour processes that fueled colonial industrialisation.
The government of independent Zimbabwe is now faced with the 
problem that both public and private enterprise had come to rely 
on this system to maintain their momentum of growth - not growth 
with equity but growth at the expense of labour. ' The "loss of 
cantidence"•atter independence is a reflection of workers’ 
apposition to this system at exploitation and private capital's 
unease at the government’s socialist philosophy. To restore 
productivity, one either has to re-instate the conditions of 
colonial exploitation, or seek new and better ways of organising 
production. This is an issue of planning, but not merely a 
technocratic one. Less authoritarian, higher-productivity and 
participatary methods of organising work in industry should be 
possible. However, the issue of preserving productive farces, 
although a real issue, is often a convenient excuse for inaction.
There seems to be a reluctance at present to proceed too rapidly 
with widespread nationalisation of industry. Hut a number of 
nationalised industries are in existence already. Perhaps a 
start could be made in the numerous parastatals or even in those
l
enterprises where the government has a sizeable equity, e.g. the 
many companies wholly or partially owned by the Industrial 
Development Corporation. In other words, there is a lot that can 
be done now to try to unlock the potential productivity ot 
workers by making it possible tor them to govern their own work 
act i vi t ies.
At present, the employment relation in public enterprises is 
structured along similar lines to that of the private sector.
I he appointment and training of managers for public enterprise 
have not been within a perspective of "red and expert". A lot 
more emphasis could be given to worker- education and workers and 
their organisations could be given mure space to influence 
managerial decisions.
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NOTES
1. In his criticism of the ultra-left, Lenin (1982), stressed the 
need to keep a balance between the simple task of -expropriating 
the expropriators* and the more difficult one of introducing and 
consolidating -country-wde accounting and control- of production 
and distribution in the expropriated or nationalised enterprises.
2. For a discussion of the Chinese experience in industrial 
organisation see C. Bettelheim (1974) and M. Lockett (1980).
3. Gartman (1978) distinguishes two types of capitalist control: 
basic control, a type of authority which is necessary in any 
large-scale production of use values regardless of the-relations 
of production under which production takes placel surplus 
control, which is necessitated by the antagonistic nature of 
production relation* under capitaliem.
4. By putting a definite limit to the land available +or African 
permanent occupation, the Land Apportionment Act ensured that the 
African system'of shitting cultivation had to be transformed to 
one of continuous cultivation, which, given the type of soils 
allocated"to the Africans, led to severe soil erosion and 
consequent decrease in the productivity of the land. See also 
Palmer (1977), Munslow (1965), Ranger (1985).
5. In 1969, during UDI, the segregation of land on a racial basis 
was re-affirmed and intensified under the 1969 Land Tenure Act. 
The fundamental principle of the Act was to ensure that the 
interests of each race were paramount in their respective areas. 
The Act made the ownership, leasing and occupation of land by one 
race in another's area more difficult. The restrictions were
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more stringent tor urban (especially residential) land than (nr 
rural land. I'he measures ensured that Africans could not acquire 
business stands in city or town areas outside designated A + r i can 
township areas (parliamentary Debates, Viol. 75, ib October,
1969). At the same time, about halt a million acres n( jand was 
taken away trom the Purchase Areas scheme and "unreserved land" 
which had been available + or purchase and occupation an a 
non-racial basis was ended and most of the area (about 5,5 
million acres out o+ a total ra+ 6 million acres) was 
re-classitied as European. The removal of Africans 'illegally' 
occupying European land was intensified. (SieeH. Dunlop, "Lan.d 
and Economic Opportunity in Rhodesia", (he Rhodesian journal—of 
Economics. Vol. 6, No. 1, March, IV/Vi) .
6. The pattern of “white" and "black" jobs in industry came to be 
established under the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act which Sett 
out the Africans from the definition of "employee" and denied 
them the right to organise in trade unions.
7. Among the major battles Here those waged in the Motor Industry 
in the early 1960s. The employers were pus*ri.ng for the 
fragmentation of journeymen’s jobs so that black semi-skilled and. 
unskilled could do those jobs. The white trade union 
representatives, on the other hand, were opposed to any dilution 
of journeymen’s work.
8. See Legislative Assembly Debates, 12th F-ebr-uary, *959 (Cqls. 
15J6-1558).
9. See “Papers re objection to amended amendment ,(No. 10). June
19/6 and also I3th, 14th and 15th Reports of the Industrial Board 
o+ the Transport Operating Industry.
ID. See Harris, P.S. (1973), "The 1973 Amendment to the
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industrial Conciliation Act”, 1 he Rhodesian Journal ot Economics,
7, a. Reports ot the Secretary tor Labour show that less strikes 
Mere recorded in the period after UU1 than a tew years before 
UDI.
11. D. Weiner 11988) discusses recent trends in land use and 
agricultural production in LSCK and CAs and evaluates land use 
forms under the resettlement programme. See also D. Weiner, et al 
(1985).
1*. A number ot studies have shown that the more Mell-tb-do 
communal households are those with access to non-farm sources ot 
income such as wage income which they use to buy tools and 
input-. See among others, 1). Weiner (1988), J. (on-going
research)•
13. See H. Coudere and 8. Marijsse (198V), »• Weiner (1988).
14. The rNi)P had envisaged that some 162 000 household- would be
resettled by mid-1985. There are two main models ot resettlement 
schemes: Model A tor individual households and Model B tor
producer co-operatives. Many observers feel that the 
resettlement scheme is perhaps too land extensive (as compared, 
tor example, to Kenya’s) and that more people could be resettled 
it the scheme was made more intensive. See the Clitte Report 
(1986), 1). Weiner (1988), Bill Kinsey, (1983).
is. Land has to be paid for immediately and in full - in some 
instances in foreign currency. Almost 50% ot the cost ot 
resettlement (estimated at S50m at end 1985, had gone to iand
purchase alone. (See Clitte Report).
16. See the Clitte Report (1986).
17. some writers, notably K. Muir, et al (1982), argue that the 
rapid drop in employment in the LSCK sector was due to the rise
in the minimum wage. See also the 001 paper.
18. Communal farmers have benefited from the substantiali ncreases 
in the prices of controlled commodities as well as from increased 
credit and extension services. Ironically, they also benefited 
from the drastic cuts in resources going to the resettlement 
programme starting in 1983 (001 Paper, p. 136), H. Coudere and S. 
Narijsse (1987, p. 4), Cliffe Report (1986,
p. 8) .
19. In their study of six villages in Mutoko, Coudere and
Narijsse (1987) found that income inequility was to be found not 
between the villages or between agro-ecological zones, but within 
villages (p. IS). Secondly, that “those societies (villages) with 
the lesser interference of market and state, thus less inserted 
in a money economy and more dependent orr subsistence, experience 
a lower mean income but also less inequality*1 <p. 16).
20. See N.P. Mayo, et al (1985).
21. L.M. Sachikonye (1986), "State, Capital and Trade Unions".
22. The lack of ’'communication" between workers and- managements 
was a major concern of the Ministry of Labour under Minister 
Kumbirai Kangai who took a personal interest in diffusing strikes 
by going round the country urging the strikers to return to work.
23. Che Herald, November 27, 198b.
24. A number of studies have shown that the minimum wage 
legislation increased real wages until about 1982 but that 
thereafter, with the introduction of the government’s 
stabilisation programme, wages have fallen in real terms. See the 
01)1 Paper.
25. Mkandawire, T. (198b), "’I he impact of the recent world
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recession on the Zimbabwean economy”, Lusaka, ILO, December.
26. See speech by Mr H.E. ‘sehr, Chairman of the Institute of 
Directors of Zimbabwe, Tte Financial' Gazette, November ZO, 1987.
27. The Financial Gazette, November 6, 1987. The Chief Justice
was speaking at a luncheon held by the Zimbabwe Chamber of 
Commerce.
28. S. Nzombe’s, research on some aspects of the Labour Relations 
Act of 1933 is in progress.
29. GDI Paper.
30. ODI Paper, op. cit.
31. C.E. Barker, et al (1986).
32. The Herald, May 16, 1987.
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